[The following text was provided to the TQM BBS by Professor Kosaku Yoshida

Japanese business success began when Western ideas were grafted onto the traditional holistic orientation of the Japanese. The success of Deming's philosophy in Japanese business cannot be understood in isolation from the Japanese environment. To help Deming's philosophy work as well in American companies, this article focuses on some of the fundamental differences in thinking processes between Japanese and American business management, especially in terms of quality and productivity, showing how these differences are rooted in two very different cultural environments.

THE SUCCESS OF Japanese business in world competition after World War II was the result of various influences and factors, including strong government leadership in planning economic development, a significant inflow of technology and capital investment from the US, an emphasis on cooperation within almost every level of the economic structure, a high quality labor force, and a high percentage of engineers in top management positions. Among these important influences on the rise of Japanese business were Dr. W. Edwards Deming's concept of quality management and the Japanese holistic cultural background that provided for the ready acceptance of Deming's teachings.

Deming's basic philosophy has contributed to the tremendous change in the way that the Japanese produce goods and provide services. His ideas have been influential throughout Japan, changing not only the fate of Japan, but also, to some extent, the history of the world.

Deming's ideas have evolved and his philosophy has been refined over time, as his ideas have been implemented within Japanese and American companies. Out of the Crisis, published in 1982,[1] reflects the latest form his philosophy has taken. Most of Deming's original ideas on management, however, had already evolved by 1950 when he taught in Japan.

In retrospect postwar Japan was a perfect environment for the acceptance and implementation of Deming's ideas regarding statistical quality control. Specifically, the holistic orientation of Japanese thinking blended smoothly with Deming's teachings for the betterment of Japanese quality management. Having successfully introduced American ideas on business to postwar Japan and having discovered how to make them work harmoniously, Deming's task today is to introduce to the American business environment an understanding of the Japanese philosophy and business environment which made his ideas successful. His philosophy derives from a profound understanding of both cultures.

To successfully apply Deming's management philosophy to American companies, it is necessary to focus on some of the fundamental differences in the thinking processes of Japanese and American business managers, especially in terms of quality and productivity, and to show how these differences are rooted in two very different cultural environments. Americans, with their analytic point of view, can adapt aspects of Eastern holistic thinking in improving productivity and quality. As an American who recognizes the fundamental differences between American and Japanese thinking processes, Deming has developed concrete instructions that can be used by American managers as a fundamental business philosophy.

ANALYTIC AND HOLISTIC APPROACHES

Japanese companies usually have a company philosophy. The Japanese tend to think that once the fundamental company philosophy is established, everything else will follow, including corporate objectives, goals and job specifications. American companies, on the other hand, emphasize clear‑cut objectives and detailed job specifications. Without these, most American workers cannot function. This difference is one of the reasons why many American companies hesitate to adopt the Japanese management style.

The following episode illustrates this point. According to Victor F. Zonana,[2] when the biotech company Amgen arranged its first joint venture with the Japanese firm Kirin, its management was amazed at the simplicity and speed of negotiations with the Japanese. Amgen's previous joint ventures with US firms had typically involved a month of negotiations and a 40‑ to 50‑page written agreement explicitly addressing every contingency. In contrast, Amgen struck the Japanese deal in only three days with a two‑ or three‑page agreement. The Americans were astonished at the phrases used by the Japanese, such as "this will be worked out," "this will be considered later," and "this will be refined."

In Theory Z[3] William Ouchi describes another episode that reveals the essential difference between American and Japanese approaches. American vice‑presidents of a major Japanese bank operating in the US would complain, "These Japanese don't understand objectives, and it drives us nuts!" Meanwhile, the president of the bank, an expatriate Japanese assigned by the Tokyo headquarters to run the US operation, would say, "These Americans just don't seem to be able to understand the objectives."

After investigation, it turned out that the Americans needed measurable performance targets, such as the amount dollar increase in loan volume or the percentage of decrease in operating costs they needed to achieve for a specified period. However, the Japanese president did not think it was necessary to give the managers measurable targets. He thought that if the managers could determine what their relationships with customers, employees, the local community, and the bank's competitors should be, then the actions they should take would automatically follow. I have termed the American approach "analytic" and the Japanese approach "holistic." The "analytic" approach takes the position that if each part is perfect, the aggregate of the parts‑‑or the whole‑‑should be perfect as well. The fundamental assumption of this approach is that if we understand each part very well, we will also understand the entirety very well. The "analytic" approach is microscopic in that it focuses on the individual parts rather than on the whole. It seeks to understand the whole by dissecting it into parts.

On the other hand, the "holistic" approach takes the position that even if each part is perfect, the whole may not be perfect. The fundamental assumption of this approach is that the entirety is more than simply the sum of the individual parts. "Synergism" or "gestalt" might be used to describe this approach.

In the example used in Theory Z, the American vice‑presidents might have thought that if they were given annual targets, and were evaluated in terms of the specified targets, and if each vice‑president worked hard to meet his goal, then the bank would perform well each quarter. As a result, the bank would also perform well in the long run. This is a typical example of analytic thinking. But the Japanese bank president might have decided that maximizing each division's measurable target or each quarter's dollar increase would not necessarily maximize the entire bank's performance. To the Japanese president, the American vice‑presidents' goals or objectives might only represent sub‑optimization. He might think that each vice‑president should learn to identify with the superordinate objective of the bank, and strive for the grand‑optimization of the entire bank over a long time period. This is typical of holistic thinking.

In the example of the joint venture agreement between Amgen and Kirin, the Amgen representative's approach was to complete the contract by means of a series of detailed statements on all aspects of the joint venture. This is characteristic of the analytical approach by which the whole is assumed to be complete when all parts have been completed. The holistic approach taken by the Japanese representative for Kirin was that if agreement was reached on the most important concepts of the nature of the joint venture, the details could be worked out later, built up from the foundation of the basic agreement. The assumption underlying this approach is that we cannot anticipate all possible future problems and prepare solutions for them ahead of time.

Deming's essential message for American management may be the recognition of the value of the holistic approach as a prelude to achieving the best balance of the two approaches within American business.

ACCEPTABILITY V.S. DESIRABILITY

A wide variety of value systems exist in the United States due to the country's history of settlement by immigrants from different cultural backgrounds. In such a multi‑ethnic environment, the common ground among value systems is necessarily limited. Consequently, people automatically develop a certain amount of tolerance and respect for value systems other than their own. To prevent chaos from developing as a result of clashing value systems, such a society identifies clear‑cut boundaries between what is, and is not acceptable in specific circumstances.

The history of Japanese society has been just the opposite of that in the United States. People of homogeneous [sic] race, language, religion, and history have existed in Japan for over fifteen centuries. They have had little interaction with other ethnic groups. This history has naturally resulted in a unified Japanese value system, one in which there are large areas of common values.

Most social values in Japan are relatively well established and widely accepted, to the extent that it has often been said that unique or individualistic people have a hard time living in Japan. This may also help to explain the rarity of unique, epoch making inventions or discoveries by the Japanese.

The Japanese almost universally share a common concept of the desirable person or worker. On the factory production floor, virtually every worker interprets in the same way the meaning of such highly generalized expressions of company philosophy as "to recognize our responsibilities as industrialists, to foster progress, to promote the general welfare of society, and to devote ourselves to the further development of world culture." [4] From this company philosophy, each worker also learns what constitutes the most desirable behavior for a worker in the company. For the Japanese worker, everything else follows once this basic concept is grasped. Consequently, a major characteristic [sic.] of Japanese companies is that management does not have to specify every detail of a worker's job.[5] Workers avoid the necessity for inflexible adherence to a specific list of aims by adapting to the company's overall objectives.[6]

[Chart 1 appears in the text at this point in the original.]

A good example of the workability of this concept in the United States is the NUMMI plant, a joint venture of GM and Toyota. Traditionally, jobs in the assembly plants of American automobile manufactures had been precisely defined based on the Taylor system.[7] However, in the NUMMI plant, managers from Toyota reduced GM's 100‑job classification into a single job classification for multi skilled workers.[8] Creating teams of multi skilled workers tremendously improved the flexibility of operation, which, in turn, provided room for judgment. Indeed, the flexibility of operation is proving to be the source of continuous improvements initiated by the production workers.

About one out of every two Japanese workers believes a worker should help coworkers whenever he has finished his own work, whereas only 16% of American workers think that way.[9] The automatic Japanese response in favor of assisting coworkers is the natural consequence of following a unified value system and a company philosophy that emphasizes contributions to the well-being of the company and society rather than to specific rules. Indeed, an important determinant of product quality is the production worker's state of mind.

The difference between the US and Japan in terms of corporate agreements and management techniques sometimes reduces to a matter of whether one begins the process with desirability or with acceptability. [The following text refers to Chart 1, q.v.] The Japanese, because of their unified value system, tend to fill in the center first, establishing what is desirable. Americans, because of their wide variety of value systems, tend to first specify the perimeter or boundary for what is acceptable. It is relatively easy to define a center for a wide area, but it is considerably more difficult to define the area's exact perimeter. Furthermore, once rigid boundaries are fixed, people naturally tend to gravitate toward meeting the lower requirements of acceptability rather than striving to achieve the more exacting ones of desirability.

THE HOLISTIC APPROACH AND JAPANESE CULTURE

Understanding the essential difference between Japanese and American thinking processes requires some understanding of Japanese culture. The common heritage and value system of the homogeneous Japanese population meant that the way one Japanese thought tended to resemble how other Japanese thought. This foundation of similar thinking provided the basis for a culture which implicitly encourages individuals to "read between the lines."

For example, in high school every Japanese studies haiku, the traditional Japanese short poem with only seventeen Japanese letters, equivalent to seventeen syllables in English. In a few phrases, haiku tries to express a deep feeling or thought. By studying haiku, Japanese students are trained to perceive an entire atmosphere or feeling by reading between the lines, that is, by paying attention to subtleties such as context and what is merely implied or suggested. A study. has shown that Japanese magazines devoted to haiku or waka (another form of short Japanese poem) are widely circulated among workers who have bought over a million copies.[10] The spirit of haiku has had such a tremendous impact on Japanese writing in general that even scientific papers and legal documents tend to be short and terse, similar to haiku and very unlike American scientific and legal documents.

Furthermore, the Japanese are educated to pick up more meaning from blank spaces than from written words. Indeed, this ability is the hallmark of the Japanese. According to the Japanese critic and philosopher Hideo Kobayashi, this characteristic is largely the result of the influence of Basho, the most famous haiku poet of seventeenth‑century Japan, who considered silence to be the most eloquent expression of poetry.[11]

Consequently, people accustomed by heritage to these societal traits do not need detailed specification of a corporate philosophy. This heritage is also the major reason why corporate philosophies exist in most Japanese companies but in few American companies, although a number of American companies have established corporate philosophies in recent years. Unlike many Americans, the Japanese are comfortable with far‑reaching, broadly encompassing, abstract statements unsupported by specific examples or elaboration.

Eastern brush painting is another aspect of Japanese culture that has influenced the Japanese in ways apparent in Japanese business today. The Eastern brush painter traditionally works quickly, his concern being to capture the total feeling about the perceived object rather than individual details of the object itself. By contrast, the emphasis in traditional Western art has been upon accuracy of detail. In Western civilization, painting has gone through a history of detailed drawing. Similarly, Western scientific development began with the analytic approach, in which most statements are detailed and specific.

Another major influence on this aspect of the Japanese viewpoint is Musashi Miyamoto, the seventeenth century samurai warrior, painter, and philosopher considered to be the strongest swordsman in Japanese history who also began a new school of martial arts. In his book Go Rin No Sho,[12] Musashi distinguished between the holistic and analytic ways of seeing things and emphasized the importance of the holistic viewpoint in any combat situation.

Musashi explains that the analytic way of seeing things, which involves the careful and dissecting observation by physical eyes only, and a focus on details is the weakest. The holistic way is stronger because it captures the entire view of the opponent. For instance, if surrounded by ten enemies, a warrior would not stare at any of them but instead would focus his vision on a distant place, thereby gaining a sense of the entire atmosphere surrounding him so that he would be able to perceive even the enemy warrior behind him. By so doing, the warrior would not be looking merely with his physical eyes, but also with what the Japanese call his "heart‑eye." This method of perception allows one to grasp a situation as a whole, and emphasizes that the entire reality of a situation consists of more than the analytical addition of its individual parts.

According to Deming's philosophy, a person who has studied statistics for many years, and who knows a tremendous number of individual facts and formulae, is not necessarily a master statistician. A master statistician, in Deming's view, is someone who grasps the entire picture of statistics, someone who sees the forest of statistics rather than merely the trees of formulae. Specifically, a master statistician has formed a holistic view from a set of individual observations. Consequently, the Japanese habit of automatically forming a holistic viewpoint provided the background for the ready acceptance of Deming's teachings over thirty years ago in Japan. For example, Japanese managers understood and adopted the control chart method without difficulty. The significance of a control chart is that it focuses on the entire picture of the process, showing whether the process as a whole is functioning as originally designed and creating desirable products. A control chart does not focus on a detailed examination of the parts of the process or on individual outputs, for we cannot obtain an entire picture of a process by analyzing individual, defective products. In other words, a control chart is a method for achieving a holistic view, not an analytic one. As a device, it allows us to see the forest instead of merely the trees.

The Japanese have had centuries of experience with the holistic viewpoint, but they have had considerably less training in the analytic approach. For Americans, the situation has been the exact opposite, a fact that underlies the episodes cited in the beginning of this article. Since their initial encounter with Western civilization about a hundred and ten years ago, the Japanese have studied and learned the skills involved in the analytic approach, so that in Japan a well‑balanced combination of the holistic and analytic approaches has been achieved and is being maintained.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MANAGEMENT

Quality Control

The differences discussed earlier also seem to exist on factory floors in the United States and Japan. A point not always well understood in American industry is that the aim of quality control is not simply to satisfy quality specifications. An excellent example in Deming's Out of the Crisis[13] illustrates this point:

My friend Robert Picketty of Paris put it this way: listen to the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra of London play Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. Now listen to some amateur orchestra play it. Of course, you like both performances: you enjoy home‑grown talent. Both orchestras met the specifications: not a mistake. But listen to the difference. Just listen to the difference!

The quality of products is not necessarily improved by a mass inspection system involving acceptance and rejection types of decision‑making. Each worker must strive for the target value rather than settle for merely meeting specification, which means that he must know what the most desirable product is, rather than merely what constitutes the acceptable product. Likewise, more generally, each worker must strive toward becoming the best worker, rather than settling for being a marginally acceptable worker. The central concept of this philosophy is basic to the Taguchi Method, which essentially claims that even after the process meets specification, the cost can be lowered if less variation occurs in relevant characteristics.[14]

The ideal statistical quality control is the process which does not require inspection‑‑that process, in other words, in which almost all products cluster close enough to the target value. Deming advises managers to: "Cease dependence on inspection to achieve quality. Eliminate the need for inspection on a mass basis by building quality into the product in the first place." [15]

A common error in quality‑control applications is thinking that quality automatically follows investment in high‑powered machine tools and the use of quality‑control procedures. If top management cannot provide an environment that restores pride and willingness to workers, an extensive level of inspection will not create high quality. If the fundamental corporate purpose is not understood by the workers, the simple application of rules and procedures will not change productivity or quality. Deming suggests creating "constancy of purpose toward improvement of product and service, with the aim to become competitive and stay in business and to provide jobs" and "adopting the new philosophy."[16] The Japanese practice this principle by establishing, reciting, and referring frequently to company philosophy.[17]

Personal Review Systems

Another area of management, reflecting the difference in Japanese and American approaches, is the personal review system. According to a survey by the Los Angeles Times and Booz‑Allen & Hamilton,[18] the performance of 59% of US chief executives is measured at least once a year compared to that of just 2% of Japan's top managers. In addition, 45% of American executives support that practice, while none of the Japanese executives support it. Finally, according to the survey, developing new technology has low priority for American executives, but Japanese managers rate it as their second highest goal.

In the United States, the performance of executives is sometimes evaluated by the quarterly dividend. American managers are also evaluated in terms of how many decisions they make. Often, the manager who makes a number of quick decisions will be promoted quickly, while the manager who makes only a far‑reaching decision every ten years has no chance of surviving.

However, in Japanese companies, generally managers are evaluated according to long‑run performance, including future potential.[19] In Japan, the manager who makes one far‑reaching decision every ten years has more chance for survival and advancement than the one who makes many decisions quickly. This difference in the desirable decision‑making habits of managers explains the difference of priority that developing new technology has for American and Japanese executives. Furthermore, maximizing the profits each quarter does not necessarily lead to maximizing long‑run profits. This distinction pinpoints the difference in time dimension inherent in the holistic and analytic points of view. On this issue, Deming has said, "Eliminate numerical goals for people in management."[20] Deming identifies "evaluation of performance, merit rating, or annual review" as deadly diseases.[21] Incentive compensation orients managers as well as hourly workers to the quick‑fix and the short‑term.

Replacement

Replacement is a fundamental idea in American management. If a part in a machine fails, it is replaced with a good one. If a worker does not do the job in a way satisfactory to management, the worker is replaced. Replacement applies not only to workers but also to CEOs. This is reflected in the selling and acquisition of divisions.

Replacement is a strategy practiced only when management conceives of a corporation as a whole that is made up of separable or replaceable parts. That is, replacement occurs only within the governing analytic concept of Western business. Within the holistic viewpoint, however, each portion of a corporation is perceived as belonging to an organic entity, wherein no part can be replaced without substantial damage to the whole structure.

In relatively established Japanese corporations, blue‑collar workers are rarely fired. If more advanced skills are required for newly introduced machines or technology, previous workers are given on‑the‑job training.[22] If an employee does not fit well in a particular job, that employee is assigned to another position. On this point Deming has said, "Institute training on the job" and "Institute a vigorous program of education and self-improvement."[23]

Likewise, if an entire division is shut down, rather than firing or laying off the employees within that division, Japanese firms will transfer those workers elsewhere within the company. When a company faces difficult times during a recession, Japanese court rulings support layoffs only after all of the following measures have failed: reduction of overtime, suspension of new recruiting, reduction of expenditures, required temporary vacations, and transfer of employees to subsidiaries or related companies.[24] Consequently, it is probably accurate to say that replacement is not practiced in Japanese management. Another reason why Japanese companies try to avoid replacement is the insecurity such a practice causes among the remaining employees. One effect of replacement is that employees become short‑term oriented, motivated solely toward looking well in the quarterly evaluations of performance. That is, employees focus merely on meeting the basic level of acceptability rather than the much higher level of desirability. Furthermore, such orientation eliminates not only the creativity of employees but also their loyalty to the company.

Like the employees within a corporation, suppliers with long histories of established business records with a corporation do not expect to be replaced under the usual circumstances of Japanese business practices.[25] Most American corporations have more than two suppliers for the same part. One of the Deming's 14 points is: "Move toward a single supplier for any one item, on a long‑term relationship of loyalty and trust."[26] Many attendants of the Deming Seminar expressed difficulty in accepting this point. Executives trained in MBA programs tend first to consider risk reduction by diversifying sources. They try to anticipate such contingencies as strikes among supplier employees, fires or other work‑stoppage emergencies, and the possibility of a supplier's gain in bargaining power. However, having multiple suppliers increases everyday costs partly due to the lack of economies of scale and the increase of variability involved in having two sources. This creates downstream losses resulting from unfit parts or difficulty in assembly, which in turn increase the chances of required rework.

Competition and Cooperation

A fourth area reflecting the difference between Japanese and American business thinking is the division or delegation of authority and responsibility. Each division or department of the typical American corporation operates and functions according to well‑defined operational procedures. Often, these autonomous divisions are in competition with each other. The basic assumption underlying this type of organizational scheme is that if each division or department functions well, the corporation as a whole functions well. However, this is similar to saying that if each note in a symphony is mastered and performed well, we can play a symphony and sound as well as the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra of London.

Many US companies explicitly or implicitly encourage competition among divisions and departments. Accordingly, all too often departments within US firms take the following attitude: "If this department helps with another department's project and makes it successful, it will deteriorate our relative advantage. If they win, we lose." Another example of this spirit of noncooperation between departments is the feuds that commonly occur between engineering design departments and production departments. When product defects are discovered, the engineering department blames the production department, and the production department blames the engineering department. Neither takes responsibility for the detects.

This kind of problem is rare in Japanese companies, where decisions are mostly made by consensus, rather than by a particular individual. Sometimes there is no clear‑cut connection between responsibility and authority in Japanese companies, whereas that connection is an integral part of the typical American business organization. The lack of a definitive connection between responsibility and authority is one reason why Japanese executives sometimes make far‑reaching, bold decisions.

Linking the concepts of responsibility and authority creates sectionalism, a kind of loyalty to the department rather than to the company or the company's objectives as a whole. The most important question should not be "Who is responsible for this project or error?" but rather "What is the corporate objective, and do we need to cooperate or compete with other departments in achieving that objective?" To achieve this kind of orientation to problem‑solving, top management must train managers to take the holistic viewpoint that naturally leads to quickly focusing on the most important question. Once fundamentals are understood in terms of corporate objectives, the solution to any issue follows automatically.

For example, the Matsushita Electric Company‑‑a consumer electrical appliance giant best known by such brand names as Panasonic, National, Quasar, and Technics‑‑has a written corporate philosophy that includes the following terse statements of corporate objectives:

1. Contribution to the welfare of society.

2. Harmony and cooperation.

3. Continuous improvement.

4. Courtesy and humility.

5. National service through industry.

6. Fairness.

7. Struggle for betterment.

8. Adjustment and assimilation.

9. Gratitude.

The company gives two kinds of training to each employee: training in basic skills and training in the Matsushita corporate philosophy. At least once every 60 days, each member of a working group presents a ten‑minute talk to the working group on the corporate philosophy. Whenever interdepartmental or interdivisional conflicts occur, the conflicts are solved smoothly and quickly by referring to the corporate philosophy.[27]

In US business, competition has become more prevalent than cooperation within corporations, hindering the smooth operation of corporations as a whole. The source of productivity in Japanese business is the delicate balance maintained between competition and cooperation, whereby the total company performance is recognized as being more than the sum of individual performances.[28] For American industry to be competitive, cooperation at all levels must be emphasized. On this issue, Deming has said, "Break down barriers between department. People in research, design, sales, and production must work as a team, to foresee problems of production and in use that may be encountered with the product and service."[29]

CONCLUSION

Americans, with their analytic point of view, can adapt aspects of Eastern holistic thinking in improving productivity in American corporations and in improving the quality of American products. As an American who realizes the distinctions between the holistic and analytic points of view, Deming has developed concrete instructions that American managers can follow to formulate a fundamental business philosophy. The successful implementation of the Deming philosophy in American business requires, as its prelude, the adoption of holistic thinking by management.

NOTES

l. Deming, W. Edwards, Out of the Crisis, MIT, Center for Advanced Engineering Study, 1982.

2. Zonana, Victor F., "Teaming Up‑‑When It Comes to Foreign Alliances, Japan Proves a More Willing Partner," Los Angeles Times, February 22, 1988.

3. Ouchi, William, Theory Z, Addison‑Wesley, Reading, MA, 1981.

4. Pascale, Richard Tanner, and Anthony G. Athos, The Art of Japanese Management, Warner Books, 1981, p. 75.

5. Iwata, Ryushi, Nihonteki No Hensei‑Genri (The Organization Principle of Japanese‑Style Management), Bunshin‑Do, Tokyo, 1984, pp. 195‑222.

6. Vogel Ezra F., Japan as Number One: Lessons for America, Harper & Row, NY, 1975, p. 145.

7. Dertouzos, M. L., R. K. Lester, R. M. Solow, and The MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity, Made in America, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989, p. 176.

8. Hof, Robert D., and James B. Treece, "The Team‑Up Has It All‑‑Except Sales," Business Week, August 14, 1989, p. 79

9. According to Sato & Whitehall study in Sato, Hiroki, "Rodosha Ishiki No Kokusai Hikaku" (International Comparison of Workers' Attitudes), Gendai No Nihonteki Keiei (Modern Japanese‑Style Management), Masumi Tsuda, ed., Yuhi‑Kaku, Tokyo, 1982, pp. 195‑226.

10. Kindaichi, Haruhiko, Nihonjin No Gengo Hyogen (Japanese Verbal Expression), Kodan‑sha, Tokyo, 1983, p. 35.

11. Kobayashi, Hideo, Watashi No Jinsei‑Kan (My View on Life), Kadokawa Shoten, Tokyo, 1987.

12. Miyamoto, Musashi, Go Rin No Sho (The Book of Five Rings), 1645; translated by Victor Harris, The Overlook Press. Woodstock, NY, 1974.

13. Deming, Out of The Crisis, 1986, pp. 140‑141.

14. For a good explanation of the Taguchi Method refer to Scherchenbach, William, W., The Deming Route to Quality and Productivity, Mercury Press/Fairchild Publications, Rockville, MD, 1986, pp. 3446.

15. Deming, Out of the Crisis, 1982, p. 12.

16. Ibid.

17. Pascale & Athos, The Art of Japanese Management, 1981, pp. 73‑74.

18. Cited in Schachter, Jim, "US Technology‑‑As a Giant Doses, Ideas Tiptoe Away," Los Angeles Times. Part 1, February 21, 1988.

19. Tsuchiya, Moriaki, Nihon‑teki Keiei No Shinwa (Myth of Japanese‑Style Management), Nihon Keizai: Shimbunsha, Tokyo, 1983.

20. Deming, Out of the Crisis, 1982, pp. 13‑14.

21. Ibid.

22. Tsuchiya, Moriaki, Nihon‑teki Keiei No Shinwa ( Myth of Japanese‑Style Management), 1983, pp. 96‑97.

23. Deming, Out of the Crisis. 1982, p. 14.

24. Ohmi, Naoto, "Nihon‑teki Keiei No Roshi Kankei" (Labor Relations in Japanese‑Style Management), Gendai No Nihon‑teki Keiei (Modern Japanese‑Style Management), Masumi Tsuda, ed., Yuhi‑Kaku, Tokyo, 1982, pp. 195‑226.

25. Tsuda, Masami, Nihonteki Keiei No Ronri (The Logic of Japanese‑Style Management), Chu‑oh Keizai Sha, Tokyo, 1984, pp. 270‑271.

26. Deming cite, p. 15.

27. Pascale & Athos, 1981, pp. 71‑76.

28. Yoshida, Kosaku, "Sources of Japanese Productivity: Competition and Cooperation," Review of Business, Vol. 7, No. 3, Winter 1985, pp. 18‑20.

29. Deming, Out of the Crisis, 1982, p. 18.

REFERENCES

Deming, W. Edwards, Out of the Crisis, MIT, Center for Advanced Engineering Study, 1982.

Dertouzos, M. L., R. K. Lester, R. M. Solow, and The MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity, Made in America. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989, p. 176.

Hof, Robert D., and James B. Treece, "The Team‑Up Has It All‑‑Except Sales," Business Week, August 14, 1989, p. 79.

Iwata, Ryushi. Nihonteki Keiei No Hensei‑Genri (The Organization Principle of Japanese Style Management), Bunshin‑Do, Tokyo, 1984, pp. 195‑222.

Kindaichi, Haruhiko, Nihonjin No Gengo Hyogen (Japanese Verbal Expression). Kodan‑sha, Tokyo, 1983, p. 35.

Kobayashi, Hideo, Watashi No Jinsei‑Kan (My View on Life), Kadokawa Shoten, Tokyo, 1987.

Miyamoto, Musashi, Go Rin No Sho (The Book of Five Rings), 1645; translated by Victor Harris, The Overlook Press. Woodstock, NY, 1974.

Ouchi, William, Theory Z, Addison‑Wesley, Reading, MA, 1981.

Ohmi, Naoto, "Nihon‑teki Keiei No Roshi Kankei" (Labor Relations in Japanese‑Style Management). Gendai No Nihon‑teki Keiei (Modern Japanese‑Style Management), ed. by Masumi Tsuda, Yuhi‑Kaku, Tokyo, 1982, pp. 195‑226.

Pascale, Richard Tanner, and Anthony G. Athos, The Art of Japanese Management, Warner Books, 1981.

Sato, Hiroki, "Rodosha Ishiki No Kokusai Hikaku," (International Comparison of Workers' Attitudes), Gendai No Nihon‑teki Keiei, (Modern Japanese‑Style Management), Sasumi Yuhi‑Kaku, Tokyo, 1985, pp. 57‑93.

Schachter, Jim, "US Technology‑‑As a Giant Dozes, Ideas Tiptoe Away," Los Angeles Times, Part I, February 21, 1988.

Scherchenbach, William W., The Deming Route to Quality and Productivity, Mercury Press/Fairchild Publications, Rockville. MD. 1986.

Tsuchiya, Moriaki, Nihon‑teki Keiei No Shinwa, (Myth of Japanese‑Style Management), Nihon Keizai: ShimbunSha, Tokyo, 1983.

Tsuda, Masami. Nihonteki Keiei No Ronri (The Logic of Japanese‑Style Management), Chu‑oh Keizai Sha, Tokyo, 1984, pp. 270‑271.

Vogel, Ezra F., Japan as Number One: Lessons for America, Harper & Row, NY, 1975, p. 145.

Yoshida, Kosaku, "Sources of Japanese Productivity: Competition and Cooperation." Review of Business, Vol. 7, No. 3 Winter 1985. pp. 18‑20.